



IT IS TIME FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS TO FACE THE TRUTH: COMMENTARY ON PHILIP CUSHMAN’S “THE EARTHQUAKE THAT IS THE HOFFMAN REPORT ON TORTURE”

STEPHEN SOLDZ, PH.D.

This paper comments on Cushman’s “The Earthquake That Is the Hoffman Report on Torture,” placing the paper in the broader context of discussion of the ethics of psychologist involvement in national security interrogations and other military operations. In a preliminary discussion of the Hoffman Report, a few details that Cushman does not get quite right are pointed out. It then discusses the reasons for American Psychological Association leaders’ behavior in this episode and the mechanisms used to deflect attention from what was really happening. Broader issues regarding the appropriate ethical roles for psychologists in national security operations, or “operational psychology,” are then discussed. Along the way issues are raised regarding the appropriate *Telos* or goal of psychology as a profession and the distinction between science and scientism. While strongly defending science, Cushman’s call for a re-moralizing of psychology is endorsed. The paper ties it all together with a call for a Truth Commission to create a permanent record of the involvement of psychologists and health professionals with the national security state in the wake of 9/11 and to make sure that lessons are learned for future generations of psychologists and citizens.

Keywords: APA; American Psychological Association; ethics; torture; interrogations; operational psychology; Hoffman Report

Philip Cushman’s article is important in emphasizing the crisis exposed by the Hoffman Report (Hoffman et al., 2015). In exploring the implications of the actions revealed in that Report, Cushman goes far beyond torture,

Stephen Soldz, Ph.D., is with the Boston Graduate School of Psychoanalysis, Brookline, MA, and Coalition for an Ethical Psychology.

Some of the ideas for this paper were developed during my 2016–2017 fellowship at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University. I thank Jean Maria Arrigo and Trudy Bond for feedback on the manuscript.

interrogation policy, or even institutional corruption and betrayal. Rather, as he correctly argues, the Report and the behaviors it exposed reveal, for all who want to see, a crisis at the very foundations of professional psychology. We owe a debt of gratitude to Cushman for calling our attention to these deeper issues.

I strongly support Cushman's call for a "genuine and critical soul-searching" (p. 316) in our profession. As Cushman's article covers an extraordinary range, I select a few to explore. But first, in a preliminary discussion of the Hoffman Report, I point out a few details that I believe Cushman does not get quite right, and I propose some of reasons for American Psychological Association (APA) leaders' behavior in this episode and the mechanisms they used to deflect attention from what was really happening. I then raise broader issues regarding the appropriate roles for psychologists in national security operations. Along the way I raise issues regarding the appropriate Telos or goal of psychology as a profession. Briefly, although I'm sure inadequately, I elaborate the distinction between science and scientism. While strongly defending science, I endorse Cushman's call for a re-moralizing of psychology and tie it all together with a call for a Truth Commission to create a permanent record of the involvement of psychologists and health professionals with the national security state in the wake of 9/11.

TORTURE, INTERROGATIONS, AND THE HOFFMAN REPORT

The involvement of the APA with the Bush-era torture program is complicated and sometimes mischaracterized. In terms of what is known publicly, it is probably not correct to say that "some APA leaders ... worked secretly with the [Department of Defense] to fit with and advance the abusive interrogation policies of the Bush administration" (p. 312), and we have no evidence that "some senior leaders of the APA were secretly engaged in justifying the participation of psychologists in the planning and execution of torture perpetrated by the US military and intelligence agencies" (p. 314-315).

The truth, apparently, is more banal but no less disturbing. Rather, APA leadership was so concerned about having good relations with the Department of Defense (DoD) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that they simply ignored the voluminous evidence that abusive interrogations were occurring. Thus, in more than 600 e-mails between APA staff and CIA, DoD, and White House staff examined by my colleagues and me, there was not a single mention of CIA or military torture (Soldz et al., 2015). Most likely, rather than explicitly tailoring APA policy to support torture, they simply ignored the possibility and, in many instances, convinced themselves that their policies were, as they claimed, acting to prevent torture. While we may never know exactly what went through people's minds at APA, I suspect self-delusion was a larger factor for most than explicit support for abuses.

APA authorities ignored abuses despite extensive public reporting of detainee ill-treatment. For example, the CIA's torture program was first reported in a December 26, 2002, front page article in the *Washington Post* (Priest and Gellman, 2002). As APA is based in Washington, D.C., and a newspaper subscription to the *Post* was practically a job requirement for informed professionals in those days, it is virtually impossible to believe that many APA staff did not read this article, the first of many. The role of

psychologists in abuses at Guantánamo and the CIA secret “black site” prisons was gradually unveiled over the coming years. Yet no one in APA leadership sought to explore the possibility, in fact the likelihood, that psychologists were part of the problem and not, as APA repeatedly claimed, part of the solution. Hoffman implied that this lack of curiosity (Cohen, 2001) was not accidental, but a deliberate decision:

During the time that APA officials were colluding with DoD officials to create and maintain loose APA ethics policies that did not significantly constrain DoD, APA officials had strong reasons to suspect that abusive interrogations had occurred. In addition, APA officials intentionally and strategically avoided taking steps to learn information to confirm those suspicions. (Hoffman et al., 2015, p. 9)

MECHANISMS OF DENIAL AND SELF-DECEPTION

It was the ability to close their eyes and ignore reality that characterized most of the actions of APA leaders in the pre-Hoffman decade. As psychoanalysts and social psychologists know well, the capacity for denial and self-delusion is present in all of us (Milburn and Conrad, 1996; Cohen, 2001). While some APA leaders may have deliberately deceived the public, many undoubtedly deceived themselves that everything was okay and failed to ask questions that might pierce their denial. The APA torture debacle thus provides yet another painful lesson in the banality of evil (Arendt, 1992).

I have previously explored the strategies used by APA to defend its policies and distract from reality (Soldz, 2009b, c). In those works, I identified a series of strategies adopted by APA to defend its policies and deflect criticism:

Identification with the Aggressor, in which APA leaders moved quickly after 9/11 to seek funding (for the psychology profession, not the organization) from, and influence with, the administration and the military/intelligence establishment....

Rigging the Process, in which an ethics task force (Psychological Ethics and National Security [PENS]) was created, which was secretly dominated by a majority of psychologists from the military/intelligence community (Benjamin, 2006a, b; Coalition for an Ethical Psychology, 2008)....

Denial, in which APA leaders cast doubt on reports that psychologists were aiding abusive interrogations or minimized this involvement as the actions of a few “bad apples” rather than as part of a systematic government program (Koocher, 2006)....

Naming Names, an absurd requirement, in light of military secrecy, whereby critics were challenged to name individual psychologists involved in torture and to provide definitive evidence of their involvement in specific abuses, and APA leaders then discredited critics for the lack of specificity (Koocher, 2006). For cases in which critics did provide names and evidence, APA’s failure to act

rendered the information useless (Bond, 2008; Eidelson, 2015; Hoffman et al., 2015)]....

We Are Here to Help: "Safe, Legal, and Ethical," in which APA leaders repeated, as if a mantra, "psychologists have a critical role to play in keeping interrogations safe, legal, ethical, and effective," ignoring increasing evidence that they kept interrogations "safe, legal, and ethical" by monitoring abuse and providing legal cover for torture (APA, 2007; cf. Coalition for an Ethical Psychology, 2008)....

We Are No Different Than Others, in which the positions of the American Medical and Psychiatric Associations were distorted to make them virtually indistinguishable from the APA position, despite (Behnke, 2008; Sade, 2008; cf. Soldz, 2006, 2016; Pope and Gutheil, 2009) clear differences....

Parsing Pain, in which the APA passed antitorture resolutions with loopholes (Benjamin, 2007) that allowed continued participation (Coalition for an Ethical Psychology, 2008) by psychologists in many forms of psychological torture....

Repressive Tolerance and Endless "Dialogue," in which the APA encouraged endless discussion in order to promote their position that participating in a program of abusive interrogations was a "complex issue" and one on which "reasonable people" can differ. These differences were then used as excuses for indefinite delay....

"*We Are Shocked!*" response in which they act as if they just discovered (Soldz, 2009a) that, perhaps, a few psychologists did indeed aid the torture regime and they suddenly realized that some members might (unjustly) blame them for years of collusion and inaction (based on Soldz, 2009b, with minor edits).

My analysis was developed nearly a decade ago. It is likely that additional strategies could now be identified. But why did they do it? Hoffman answered that they were currying favor with the DoD to further the psychology profession. I concur with this analysis. While there was undoubtedly an element of intentional duplicity behind some of these actions, many genuinely believed they were doing the right thing. But why did so many go along?

From observation and discussions with many participants, several contributing factors stand out. Many involved in APA governance were motivated by membership in the in-group and/or career opportunity. This desire, of course, is both understandable and, at times, even laudable. However, it also creates vulnerabilities. For example, many of those on APA's Council of Representatives appeared to be rather conflict averse. This made it hard for those members to raise, or even consider, critical questions when the leadership dismissed those questions as silly or irrelevant. Many in APA were in positions that would require direct challenge of leaders and other colleagues if they were to dispute the Association's interrogations policy. Such a challenge, difficult for many in the best of times, became almost unthinkable as critics of the torture policy were in many instances mocked and treated as pariahs, in effect, enemies of psychology. For example, in 2012 the president of APA's Division 42 (Independent Practice) wrote

my colleagues and me in the Coalition for an Ethical Psychology on behalf of the division's board, accusing us of harming the psychology profession by making claims that were later supported by the Hoffman report:

We request that your Coalition stop using the press to spread all negative information about its dissatisfaction with APA. You are harming our practice of psychology by giving false and biased information and therefore, impacting negatively on the ability of people who need psychological services to receive them from ethical and competent psychologists in independent practice. (Younggren, 2012; cf. Coalition for an Ethical Psychology, 2012b)

The conflict-averse quality of APA is manifest in an extreme emphasis on "civility" as a dominant value in internal discussions. While civility in dialog can further constructive engagement, for many years civility came to be identified with not challenging Association policies in this area, as can be seen from the Division 42 letter. To question whether APA leaders were colluding with the CIA or the DoD routinely evoked attack. In several instances, those who raised questions were banned from posting on listservs. As late as December 2014, after commencement of the Hoffman investigation, a senior APA leader reportedly referred in a talk to critics as "those who will never be satisfied."

A related "strategy," which appeared so natural to many that it was sometimes adopted even by Association critics, was to impose standards upon "dissidents" that were not imposed upon defenders of APA's policies. Thus, I was asked by a state Association newsletter for permission to reprint an article of mine. However, the article never appeared. When I asked why, I was told that no one from APA would respond to me and that it would be "biased" to publish my article without a response. It goes without saying that numerous APA comments and articles were published without any type of response from critics. In another instance I arrived at a university where I was to speak at a conference on torture policy, only to be told that the psychology department objected to my being invited without the APA ethics director being invited to respond. However, after the APA membership in 2008 overwhelmingly repudiated APA interrogation policy by adopting the member-initiated referendum with a 59% vote, that ethics director delivered talks for state associations explaining APA's interrogation policy. As far as I'm aware, no critics were ever invited to give an alternative view representing that of the majority membership at these events.

COMPLEXITY

Among other factors that contributed to the lack of questioning of APA leadership was the complexity of the interrogations issue. APA repeatedly insisted, and stated in resolutions, that it was opposed to "torture" and "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" (2007). These assertions were reassuring to many. Why was an organization that routinely condemned "torture" being attacked for allegedly supporting the torture program? To understand this required detailed factual knowledge that many, understandably, had neither time nor inclination to acquire. One would have to keep track of

ever-evolving knowledge regarding psychologist involvement in CIA interrogations and at Guantánamo. One would have to understand issues around the definition of torture, such as the U.S. Reservations to the UN Convention on Torture (U.S. Reservations) and the problematic legal reasoning engaged in by the Bush administration Office of Legal Counsel in its torture memos. And one would have to pay attention to the membership of the APA's PENS task force and think through the possible effects of that membership on the task force deliberations. Understandably, to many, knowing and making sense of all this material was daunting. It was easier to trust assurances from leaders that everything was fine, that the critics were wrong, even malicious. To distrust those leaders would have created often intolerable emotional and cognitive demands.

Unfortunately, this complexity is so great that Cushman himself makes mistakes. For example, he attributes the U.S. Reservations to the G. W. Bush administration and stated they were influenced by a 2002 Torture Memo (p. 315), when in fact these Reservations were adopted by the Senate in 1990, during the G. H. W. Bush administration (Parry, 2010), although the Convention was not fully ratified until 1994, during the Clinton administration.

Complexity has all too often been a tool of the powerful and can be used as a smokescreen to distract attention from controversial policies. Prior to the Iraq War, very few, even among reporters, could see the weakness in U.S. claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and many of those making war policy failed to appreciate the implications the Sunni–Shia divide in Iraq would have for the success of U.S. policies. Similarly, only a few individuals, such a radical journalist I. F. Stone (1964), could penetrate the complex Johnson Administration testimony to Congress, which supported the 1965 Gulf of Tonkin resolution Johnson used to justify U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

In addition to the issues around moral education that Cushman raises and that I discuss next, we need to think more about how to increase tolerance for complexity among our colleagues and students. In psychoanalysis, at times an intolerance for complexity contributes to our tendency to identify with schools, each claiming uniquely valuable knowledge. Tolerance for complexity also requires a tolerance for not knowing, for ignorance (Firestein, 2012). It also entails an understanding of the processes and procedures that help develop reliable knowledge in a given area. At the same time, we must avoid falling into the pit of relativism that resolves complexity by insisting that there is no truth. If all views are valid, there is no reason to challenge the dominant ones that make life easy for those who adopt them.

TELOS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Cushman is correct that one major factor in the torture debacle was the weakness of moral education in our graduate programs. Implicit in Cushman's argument are two related issues here. One concerns the inadequacy of moral or ethical education. The other concerns the lack of a clear, agreed-upon ethical identity for the profession of psychology.

One aspect of professions is that they strive toward an ideal or *Telos* (Oakley and Cocking, 2001; Lynch, 2004). For example, the *Telos* of medicine can be conceived of

as the furtherance of health. This Telos is implicitly embodied in the Hippocratic Oath and its varied modern derivatives. As the recently revised World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva states, “As a member of the medical profession; I solemnly pledge to dedicate my life to the service of humanity; the health and well-being of my patient will be my first consideration” (Parsa-Parsi, 2017, p. 1971). Similarly, based on the American Psychoanalytic Association’s (n.d.) Vision statement, psychoanalysis could be thought of as having a Telos something like the use of knowledge of unconscious motivational processes to advance human potential and relieve suffering.

Although not immune from complexities (Bloche, 2011), in medicine the Telos is often used as a guide in evaluating ethically acceptable activities for physicians. Thus, when confronted with the involvement of psychiatric physicians in the Bush administration torture program, the American Medical Association (AMA) drew upon the physician’s role as healer in its analysis asserting that physicians have no role in interrogations of any kind, national security or domestic (AMA, 2006a, b). A similar process occurred when the AMA confronted the involvement of physicians in administering the death penalty or physician-assisted suicide.

Psychology, in contrast, has no clear Telos. The APA ethics code begins its preamble with an extremely broad statement: “Psychologists are committed to increasing scientific and professional knowledge of behavior and people’s understanding of themselves and others and to the use of such knowledge to improve the condition of individuals, organizations, and society” (APA, 2016, Preamble, para. 1). While the breadth of this statement is understandable given the enormous diversity of activities undertaken by psychologists, it provides essentially no guidance as to what are appropriate professional activities.

The code defines basic principles that are supposed to guide ethical decision making; however, these principles are presented as being solely aspirational in nature, making them easy to ignore in practice. Thus, *Principal A: Beneficence and Nonmaleficence* states,

Psychologists strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm. In their professional actions, psychologists seek to safeguard the welfare and rights of those with whom they interact professionally and other affected person. (APA, 2016, General Principles, Principle A, para. 1)

Its wording might lead one to suspect that psychologist involvement in CIA secret prisons or the Guantánamo Detention Center where people are routinely harmed and deprived of rights is a clear violation of this principle. However, the principle’s aspirational nature made it easy for the majority in APA leadership to ignore this apparent contradiction for many years.

A major task for the psychology profession, therefore, is to have a serious, broad-based discussion of whether our profession has a Telos, and if it does, what that Telos is. Are we in fact a profession dedicated to beneficence and nonmaleficence? If so, how do we give these principles enough meaning that they actually guide our professional practices? Are there activities, other than sex with patients, that psychologists abstain

from not because they are wrong for everyone but because they are wrong for members of a profession dedicated to a particular *Telos*? Disturbingly, the answer to the latter is “no” for some in our profession. For instance, a military operational psychologist recently argued that any activity that is ethical in general should always be allowed for professional psychologists (Staal, 2018; cf. Soldz et al., *in press-a, b*).

To a great degree, ethics education of psychologists consists of teaching rules regarding what is and is not allowed. The attitude is, “Follow the rules and you will not get in trouble.” I believe Cushman and I agree that whatever this is, it is not ethics education. As if in confirmation, I recently had an extended conversation on these issues with a senior APA leader. When I stated that, in many ways, there is a paucity of true ethics education in our field, this leader stated essentially, “I do not know about your training, but I certainly had training in ethics. For example, I was taught that it was wrong to sleep with patients.” Alas, this leader appeared unable to even comprehend the difference between being taught rules to follow and the moral education that Cushman calls for.

OPERATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

One sign that something is missing in our profession’s thinking about its ethical foundations is the lack of attention in this post-Hoffman world to the broader issues regarding the roles of psychology in military and intelligence operations, roles other than the traditional clinical role of treating troops or prisoners of war. I’m referring to roles that are known as *operational psychology*. While controversy over the proper role of psychologists in national security interrogations riled the profession, participation in interrogations was only a small portion of actions psychologists were performing to further potentially abusive military and intelligence operations. As examples, psychologists have become involved in hostage negotiations, selection of operatives for high-risk missions, resistance-to-interrogation training, drone target selection, psychological warfare, identification of personal weaknesses in suspected spies for opponent powers, and development of strategies for spreading false rumors on the Internet to delegitimize opponents. Some of these activities are relatively unproblematic for psychologists, while others raise disturbing issues regarding the role of beneficence and nonmaleficence in our profession.

My colleagues and I have been writing and talking for years about the complex ethical issues raised by aspects of operational psychology that appear to be in conflict with values on which our profession claims to be based (Arrigo, Eidelson, and Bennett, 2012; Coalition for an Ethical Psychology, 2012a; Arrigo, Eidelson, and Rockwood, 2015; Ethics of Operational Psychology Workshop, 2015; Soldz, Arrigo, and Olson, 2016; Soldz, 2017; Soldz, Olson, and Arrigo, 2017; Soldz et al., *in press-a, b*). One might think that a profession that had just gone through a decade of controversy over participation in abusive national security interrogations might want to explore these ethical issues in light of the issues raised by the interrogations controversy. However, other than defenses by operational psychologists themselves (C. H. Kennedy and Williams, 2011; K. Kennedy, Borum, and Fein, 2011; Staal and Greene, 2015a, b; Staal, 2018, b), there is been little willingness to explore the ethics of operational psychology before another professional scandal occurs. As APA commences its first

major ethics code revision since the interrogations controversy erupted, it is to be hoped that the task force will not shy away from confronting these issues.

SCIENTISM AND INTERPRETIVE TURN

Cushman passionately and reasonably argues that what he calls the scientific bent of modern U.S. psychology is problematic. While I agree with him on this, I am concerned that critiques of scientism all too often turn into derisive dismissals of science. I agree with Cushman that science is not an answer to everything, but it is a remarkably powerful and useful tool. Cushman follows many others in arguing that the problem is that psychology's concept of science is modeled on that of the "natural sciences." He then goes on to critique an overreliance on procedures as defining science. Although procedures can be remarkably useful, they should never be identified with science itself. Unfortunately, what is taught as the "scientific method" in methodology courses often butchers true scientific methods, reducing them, as Cushman argues, to procedures. Cushman (p. 321) and I agree that scientism in psychology is a caricature of the methods of the natural sciences.

Rather, I prefer to think of science as Firestein (2012) does, as an attempt to grapple with the immense *ignorance* about the world that we face. The various methods and procedures used by working scientists are tools to reduce potential confounds and thus increase the reliability of the resultant knowledge. However, all methods and procedures have weaknesses. Psychology tends toward fetishization of the controlled experiment. Experiments are extremely powerful tools, allowing researchers to make causal inferences regarding questions that can be studied in circumscribed domains. However, among their weaknesses are difficulties dealing with complex, multi-causal phenomena and with phenomena that vary by context in complex ways.

It is not true that good scientists in psychology, or any other field, know only how to follow strict procedures, as Cushman caricatures. Rather, good scientists have a toolbox of potential methods and remain open, even excited, at the prospect of learning or creating new ones that are more appropriate to the domain that they're studying. To a reasonable degree, the history of scientific progress is the history of the discovery of new methods. This is true of psychology as well, although perhaps not to the degree that I, or Cushman, believe is desirable.

The reason I stress these points is that too often, concerns about straitjacketed psychology get sidelined into other debates, such as that between qualitative and quantitative methods; I'm concerned that Cushman leans a bit too far in this direction. From my perspective, both quantitative and qualitative methods are among the tools that we should have available as we seek to reduce our ignorance in some areas so that we can better grapple with other domains of ignorance. While none of us is going to be comfortable and competent with all the tools potentially available, that should not blind us to alternative tools appropriate to phenomena we are trying to study.

Science remains vital to us as one of the few tools for knowledge generation whose validity is relatively long-lasting. I am firmly in the camp of believers that scientism should be challenged by better, more flexible science appropriate to the complexities of

people embedded in complex social worlds, people who themselves subjectively interpret that world around them. However, I do not see human subjectivity as fundamentally changing the ways in which human activity should be studied. I follow those psychologists like Piaget and George Kelly (1955; Maher, 1969) who believe that science can be a useful tool to help us understand our subjective worlds, rather than with those who would forgo “objective” science for acceptance of the subjective nature of human existence. Cushman and I may, perhaps, disagree here.

panopticism

One very interesting issue that Cushman derives from his critique of proceduralism in science is what he called panopticism, resulting in “ever-present anxiety or guardedness about being seen or punished” (Cushman, p. 324). (In this he followed Foucault’s critique of Bentham’s panopticon, or institution in which inmates lack all privacy as they are always visible.) I am concerned about the extremely rapid development of our Total Surveillance Society, in which all communications can be surveilled by intelligence agencies, all purchases and online browsing can be surveilled by corporations, and increasingly, license plate and facial recognition software will allow authorities to track all personal movements. An extreme of panopticism is the use of drones as spy tools and weapons; drones make every individual a potential target (Soldz, 2015).

As the world of drones, other surveillance, and big data grows ever larger, the very concept of privacy is rapidly disappearing. For example, those privacy warnings that HIPPA has led many clinicians to put at the bottom of their e-mail have a quaint quality, as we know that every one of those e-mails is subject to logging and reading by the National Security Agency, should they choose to do so. I’ve yet to see a HIPPA warning to clients that honestly states that all communications potentially are subject to government surveillance.

However, until I heard Cushman (2016) deliver an earlier version of this paper at APA a couple years ago, I had never thought of the increasing tendency to observe and monitor trainees and clinicians as a manifestation of this broader social tendency. Nor had I thought very deeply about the level of chronic anxiety that we create in our students and therapists through this obsessive monitoring. Calling attention to this growing phenomenon is one of the major contributions of Cushman’s paper. I hope that it will result in far more frank discussion about the dark side of continual monitoring while not eliminating the role of feedback in skill development.

RE-MORALIZING PSYCHOLOGY

While I am a firm defender of science, and a committed critic of scientism, I agree with Cushman that our field needs more than science. There is no question that many look to psychology for insights into how we ought to live, not only how we do live. And, as a profession, we simply cannot avoid questions of how we as professionals ought to act and, as important, how we ought not to act. It is a sad comment on the state of psychological science that the other scientifically oriented psychological association, the

Association for Psychological Science, uttered not a peep during the decade-long controversy about psychologist involvement in torture and other abuse. When approached, they offered to have a session at their conference on the efficacy of torture but declined to say anything regarding its morality.

Cushman correctly contrasts moral thinking with the following of rules and procedures that too often occurs in our graduate programs. And he is right that moral education properly draws upon the humanities and cultural history. At points, however, he appears to desire to replace most of the existent curriculum, based as it is on psychological science, with this humanity-based approach. While I agree that our field should be wide enough to include such an educational approach, I do not see many wishing for such a radical transformation of the curriculum. Nor do I think that it would be wise, in general. As just noted, a rejection of scientism should not lead to a rejection of science, and our field has an increasing scientific base that the curriculum currently fails to do justice to.

Thus, we are faced with a dilemma of how to integrate some of the broader thinking that Cushman correctly encourages us to embrace without, as he seems at points to wish for, this alternative curriculum replacing a large percentage of courses. Already, in many clinical psychology programs there are so many courses mandated by accreditation bodies that much of contemporary psychology, including material that Cushman encourages us to adopt, ends up being ignored. I do not know the solution to this dilemma, but I cannot endorse Cushman's apparent desire to replace current psychology with "training and historical consciousness, moral discourse, psychodynamic relational or intersubjective theory" (p. 325). I do agree that we need more teaching of critical cultural history and ethical reasoning, as Cushman suggests.

HISTORY AND NEED FOR A TRUTH COMMISSION

One issue on which Cushman and I strongly agree is the importance of students learning the history of psychology, with an emphasis on both its liberatory potential and its misuses in enforcing conformity. Psychological testing should never be taught independent of understanding its role in eugenics and the feeding of anti-immigrant fever in the early parts of the last century. Learning about psychoanalysis includes learning about its role in enforcing gender normativity and the pain it caused to parents of schizophrenics and autistic children when the parents were identified as the causes of their children's problems. Behaviorism and biological psychology both have their abuses.

While many of the aforementioned abuses have made their way into our curricula in recent decades, the problematic history of relationships of psychology to military and intelligence agencies has not. This may be, at least in part, because of the high esteem that the military are held in contemporary U.S. society, leading to the exploration of these issues being seen as "anti-military." But it may also be in part because the story of psychology's involvement with the military is such a lengthy one, involving so many of the leaders of the field. After all, at least since World War I, psychologists' work for the military has played a major role in the creation of the profession and the development of APA (Capshew, 1999; Summers, 2008).

This is not to claim that all involvement of psychology with the security sector is bad. Certainly, the work done by clinical military psychologists treating troops suffering from the stresses and traumas of deployment and war is vitally important. Other activities, such as psychological screening for high-risk missions are ethically unobjectionable (Arrigo et al., 2012; Arrigo et al., 2015; Soldz et al., 2017). There are likely varying opinions about the role of psychologists in the Office of Strategic Services in aiding the fight against fascism in World War II.

However, there is a long history of problematic involvements of psychology with the military and intelligence agencies. To mention only a few, Berkun, Timiras, and Pace (1954) studied the effects on soldiers of witnessing a nuclear test two miles from ground zero; the soldiers were not informed of the dangers of fallout. In another study of “degradation of behavior in combat,” Berkun et al. (1962) conducted a series of studies in which recruits were induced to believe they were about to die in various ways so that their operation of equipment under stress could be studied.

At the same time that Berkun was engaging in these stress studies, the CIA had an enormous set of multibillion-dollar research and operational projects, under projects MKULTRA and Artichoke, on coercive interrogation, brainwashing, and mind control. Part of the genius was giving programs like these bizarre names, with the result that anyone who discussed them sounded like a conspiracy nut. Among the many activities conducted under these projects was the secret dosing of thousands of individuals with LSD; the CIA controlled the world supply of this drug for many years. Among those dosed were prisoners, mental patients, men lured into brothels by prostitutes, and possibly an entire village in France (Marks, 1991; Albarelli, 2009; Albarelli and Kaye, 2010). At McGill University, psychiatrist Ewan Cameron engaged in “depatterning” of mental patients, which involved drug-induced sleep and massive electroshock twice a day to disorganize their mind, followed by subjecting them to messages on headphones played up to a half a million times. Despite the horrific nature of this “research,” Cameron published his disguised results in first-tier psychiatry journals and was elected president of both the American and World Psychiatric Associations. Other MKULTRA work involved the identification of psychological torture techniques, which became codified in a chapter in the CIA’s interrogation manual that served as the basis for teaching torture to Latin American militaries and intelligence agencies (McCoy, 2006).

MKULTRA involved more than 100 psychologists and other behavioral and social scientists, dozens of universities, mental hospitals, and prisons among other institutions (Greenfield, 1977; Marks, 1991). In many cases the identities of these researchers and institutions were kept classified, leading to a Supreme Court decision protecting their identity (*CIA v. Sims*, 1985; Dube and Ziebell, 1986).

The psychoanalytic community was not immune from involvement with the Intelligence Community. The psychoanalytically oriented hospital Chestnut Lodge, home of Harold Searles and Frieda Fromm-Reichman, was also the CIA’s favorite facility (Plante, 1974; Albarelli, 2009). Knuth Müller (2017) recently published a monograph of more than 1,100 pages on relations between psychoanalysts and the U.S. military and security services. As this monograph is in German, it will be difficult for many U.S. readers. However, pursuit of the numerous extensive tables will give a

sense of the magnitude of these relationships. Among sectors of the psychoanalytic community in recent years, there has been a sense of superiority that *our* members were not involved in the APA's collusion. Müller's monograph should help convince these individuals that the psychoanalytic community's relative freedom from recent torture collusion had more to do with the relative powerlessness of the psychoanalytic world in recent decades than it did with any moral superiority we analysts may possess.

Despite major efforts to hide them, the CIA programs became public in the early 1970s, leading to Senate hearings (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, 1977). However, the APA did nothing to promote accountability for those psychologists who participated in abuses. Nor, other than publish a couple of articles in the *APA Monitor*, the APA monthly magazine (Asher, 1975; "CIA: 'This May Be,'" 1977; Greenfield, 1977), did it do much to learn lessons from this sordid period in our profession's history that could help avoid repetition.

In one *Monitor* article, author Greenfield (1977) outlined a number of important questions for psychologists raised by the experience of (sometimes covert, sometimes overt) CIA funding:

How were psychologists and other social scientists enlisted by the CIA? What did they do? What, if any, is the scientist's responsibility for the applications of research? How are social scientists affected by social and political forces? What are the implications of covert funding? (para. 11)

This CIA recruitment of psychologists and others into its research endeavors was just one then-public example of how the intelligence services infiltrated, and often undermined the independence of, civil society institutions, such as the agency's infiltration and decades-long control of the National Student Association (Paget, 2015).

In fact, the APA itself, as well as a member of its Board of Directors at the time, was covertly funded by the CIA (Greenfield, 1977). Despite this, apparently the APA did nothing to answer Greenfield's questions. Through their inaction, the APA may have lost an opportunity to prevent some of the post-9/11 abuses. Imagine if they had acted to learn lessons, and if this episode in psychology's history and its lessons had been incorporated into our curricula.

In the wake of the earthquake that is the Hoffman Report, it is vital that we do not repeat the mistakes that were made when the CIA's MKULTRA program became public in the 1970s. We need a Truth Commission for the health and behavioral science professions, if possible, and for psychology alone, if the broader commission does not have the necessary support from the other professions. This Commission would create a public record of what is known about health professional and behavioral scientist involvement in national security interrogations, including both the Cold War and post-9/11 periods, at a minimum. Included also would be the varied post-9/11 conferences between intelligence services, the APA, and other representatives of social and behavioral sciences at which interrogation-related topics were discussed (Soldz, 2011; Soldz et al., 2015). However, the Commission should go beyond interrogations to adopt

a forward-looking examination of other involvement of health professional and behavioral scientist involvement in security-sector operations. The Commission would try to answer the kind of questions raised by Greenfield in her article on Cold War CIA uses of psychology and related social and health sciences. However, given the complexity of post-9/11 history, the questions would need expansion, including examination of overt rather than covert security-sector involvement with health and behavioral sciences.

This Commission would not necessarily result in definitive answers to the complex questions raised. The Commission's report would be a major contribution to preserving and disseminating our profession's post-9/11 history to future generations of psychologists. It could result in the creation of guides outlining issues to be carefully considered by psychologists contemplating involvement with intelligence services. Convening such a Commission would help counter the post-Hoffman efforts of a number of individuals to delegitimize the Hoffman Report and intimidate scholars from citing and teaching it (PsychCoalition, n.d.; Bolgiano and Taylor, 2015; Soldz and Reisner, 2016; Engber, 2017; LoCicero, 2017; Puente, 2017; Summers, 2017). For if we do not examine, preserve, and teach the lessons of this near two decades of torture collusion, our profession will be condemned to commit similar mistakes in a future crisis. As Cushman so eloquently argues, history is one of the most important weapons we have to create a more humanistic psychology. We cannot afford to surrender that weapon.

REFERENCES

- Albarelli, H. P., Jr. (2009), *A Terrible Mistake: The Murder of Frank Olson, and the CIA's Secret Cold War Experiments*. Waltherville, OR: Trine Day.
- Albarelli, H. P., Jr. & Kaye, J. S. (2010, February 17), The real roots of the CIA's rendition and Black Sites program. *Truthout*. Retrieved from <http://www.truthout.org/the-real-roots-cias-rendition-black-sites-program56956>
- American Medical Association. (2006a, June 12), New AMA ethical policy opposes direct physician participation in interrogation. Retrieved from <http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/16446.html>
- American Medical Association. (2006b), *Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs: Physician participation in interrogation (Res. 1, I-05)* (Series American Medical Association, Ed.; Vol. 2007). Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20111015024909/http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_10a06.pdf
- American Psychoanalytic Association. (n.d.), APsAA Mission & Vision. Retrieved March 29, 2018, from <http://www.apsa.org/content/apsaa-mission-vision>
- American Psychological Association. (2016), Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct. Retrieved from <http://apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx>
- American Psychological Association. (2007, September), Frequently asked questions regarding APA's policies and positions on the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during interrogations. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from <http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2007/10/faq-nterrogation.aspx>
- American Psychological Association. (2007, August 19). Reaffirmation of the American Psychological Association position against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment and its application to individuals defined in the United States Code as "enemy combatants." Retrieved from <http://www.apa.org/governance/resolutions/councilres0807.html>
- Arendt, H. (1992), *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Penguin.
- Arrigo, J. M., Eidelson, R. J. & Bennett, R. (2012), Psychology under fire: Adversarial operational psychology and psychological ethics. *Peace Confl.* 18:384.

- Arrigo, J. M., Eidelson, R. J. and Rockwood, L. P. (2015), Adversarial operational psychology: Returning to the foundational issues. *Peace Confl.* 21:282–284. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000109>
- Asher, J. (1975, November), DOD, CIA, LSD: An unholy trio. *APA Monitor*, p. 4.
- Behnke, S. (2008), Ethics and interrogations: Comparing and contrasting the American Psychological, American Medical and American Psychiatric Association positions. *Monit. Psychol.* 7:66–67.
- Benjamin, M. (2006a, July 26), Psychological warfare. *Salon*. Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20110319151408/http://www.salon.com:80/news/feature/2006/07/26/interrogation/>
- Benjamin, M. (2006b, August 4), Psychologists group still rocked by torture debate. *Salon*. Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20110128094254/http://www.salon.com:80/news/feature/2006/08/04/apa/>
- Benjamin, M. (2007, September 5), Will psychologists still abet torture? *Salon*. Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20091213140020/http://www.salon.com:80/news/feature/2007/08/21/psychologists/index.html>
- Berkun, M. M., Bialek, H. M., Kern, R. P. and Yagi, K. (1962), Experimental studies of psychological stress in man [Special issue]. *Psychol. Monol.* 76(15):1–39.
- Berkun, M. M., Timiras, P. S. & Pace, N. (1954), Psychological and physiological responses in observers of an atomic test shot. *Psychol. Rep.* 4:679–682.
- Bloche, M. G. (2011), *The Hippocratic Myth: Why doctors Are Under Pressure to Ration Care, Practice Politics, and Compromise Their Promise to Heal*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bolgiano, D. G. & Taylor, J. (2015, August 7), Honi soit qui mal y pense: Evil goings on behind the American Psychological Association Report on Interrogation. Retrieved from <http://psychcoalition.org/5/post/2015/08/honi-soit-qui-mal-y-pense.html>
- Bond, T. (2008, May 19), If not now, when? An open letter to Dr. Stephen Behnke on psychologists engaged in torture. *CounterPunch*. Retrieved from <http://counterpunch.org/bond05192008.html>
- Capshew, J. H. (1999), *Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929–1969*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, No. 83–1075 (1985, April 16), Retrieved from <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/159/>
- Coalition for an Ethical Psychology. (2008, January 16), Analysis of the American Psychological Association’s Frequently Asked Questions Regarding APA’s Policies and Positions on the Use of Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment During Interrogations. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20091211031619/http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org:80/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/apa_faq_coalition_comments_v12c.pdf
- Coalition for an Ethical Psychology. (2012a, July 26), Adversarial operational psychology is unethical for psychologists: Coalition for an Ethical Psychology. Retrieved from <http://www.ethicalpsychology.org/pens/Adversarial-Operational-Psychology-Is-Unethical-for-Psychologists.pdf>
- Coalition for an Ethical Psychology. (2012b, October 31), Coalition response to letter from APA’s Division 42 Board. Retrieved from <http://www.ethicalpsychology.org/resources/div42-10-31-12.php>
- Cohen, S. (2001), *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Cushman, P. (2016, August), The earthquake that is the Hoffman Report: Toward a re-moralization of psychology. Presented at the Annual meeting of the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, APA Division 24, Denver, CO.
- Dube, L. J. & Ziebell, L. M. (1986), The Supreme Court and the intelligence source. *Studies in Intell.* 30(4):1–18.
- Eidelson, R. (2015), “No cause for action”: Revisiting the ethics case of Dr. John Leso. *J. Soc. Polit. Psychol.* 3:198–212.
- Engber, D. (2017, September 5), The Bush torture scandal isn’t over. *Slate*. Retrieved from http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2017/09/should_psychologists_take_the_blame_for_green_lighting_bush_era_enhanced.html
- Ethics of Operational Psychology Workshop. (2015, September 20), The Brookline Principles on the Ethical Practice of Operational Psychology. Retrieved from <http://psychintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Brookline-Principles-of-Ethics-of-Op-Psych.pdf>

- Firestein, S. (2012), *Ignorance: How It Drives Science*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Greenfield, P. (1977), CIA's behavior caper. *APA Monitor* 1:10–11.
- Hoffman, D. H., Carter, D. J., Lopez, C. R. V., Benzmilller, H. L., Latifi, S. Y. & Craig, D. C. (2015), Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of the American Psychological Association: Independent review relating to APA ethics guidelines, national security interrogations, and torture (p. 542). Chicago: Sidley Austin, LLP. Retrieved from <http://www.apa.org/independent-review/revise-report.pdf>
- Kelly, G. A. (1955), *The Psychology of Personal Constructs* (Vols. 1–2). New York: Norton.
- Kennedy, C. H. & Williams, T. J. (2011), *Ethical Practice in Operational Psychology: Military and National Intelligence Applications*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Kennedy, K., Borum, R. & Fein, R. (2011), Ethical dilemmas in psychological consultation to counter-intelligence and counterterrorism activities. In: *Ethical Practice in Operational Psychology: Military and National Intelligence Applications*, eds. C. H. Kennedy & T. J. Williams. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 69–83.
- Koocher, G. (2006), Speaking against torture. *Monit. Psychol.* 37(2):5.
- LoCicero, A. (2017, August 15), What keeps APA from healing? Retrieved from <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/paradigm-shift/201708/what-keeps-the-apa-healing>
- Lynch, T. D. (2004), Virtue ethics, public administration, and Telos. *Global Virt. Ethics Rev.* 5(4):32–49.
- Maher, B. (Ed.). (1969), *Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly*. New York: Wiley.
- Marks, J. D. (1991), *The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate."* New York: Norton.
- McCoy, A. W. (2006), *A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror*. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt. Retrieved from <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0625/2005051124-b.html>
- Milburn, M. A. & Conrad, S. D. (1996), *The Politics of Denial*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Müller, K. (2017), *Im Auftrag der Firma*. Gießen, Germany: Psychosozial-Verlag.
- Oakley, J. & Cocking, D. (2001), *Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Paget, K. M. (2015), *Patriotic Betrayal: The Inside Story of the CIA's Secret Campaign to Enroll American Students in the Crusade Against Communism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Parry, J. T. (2010), *Understanding Torture: Law, Violence, and Political Identity*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Parsa-Parsi, R. W. (2017), The Revised Declaration of Geneva: A modern-day physician's pledge. *JAMA* 318:1971–1972.
- Plante, H. (1974, October 24), Inside Chesnut Lodge. *The Sentinel*. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP91-00901R000500110034-7>
- Pope, K. S. & Gutheil, T. G. (2009), Contrasting ethical policies of physicians and psychologists concerning interrogation of detainees. *BMJ* (b1653). Retrieved from http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/extract/338/apr30_2/b1653
- Priest, D. & Gellman, B. (2002, December 26), U.S. decries abuse but defends interrogations. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356_pf.html
- PsychCoalition. (n.d.), Retrieved from <http://psychcoalition.org/index.html>
- Puente, A. E. (2017, August 18), APA president responds to LoCicero blog on Psychology Today. Retrieved from <http://www.apa.org/news/press/response/locicero-blog.aspx>
- Sade, R. M. (2008), Letter to the *Monitor on Psychology*: Ethics and interrogations (with a reply by Stephen Behnke). *Monit. Psychol.* 8:4.
- Soldz, S. (2006), American Medical Association emphasizes interrogation policy differences with APA. *OpEdNews*. Retrieved from http://www.opednews.com/maxwrite/print_friendly.php?p=opedne_stphen_060828_american_medical_ass.htm

- Soldz, S. (2009a, June 18), APA Board makes major statement on torture. Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20090826164405/http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org:80/blog/2009/06/18/apa-board-makes-major-statement-on-torture/>
- Soldz, S. (2009b, June 24), Can the American Psychological Association break with torture collusion? Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20091101161523/http://blog.aclu.org/2009/06/24/can-the-american-psychological-association-break-with-torture-collusion/>
- Soldz, S. (2009c), Closing eyes to atrocities: U.S. psychologists, detainee interrogations, and response of the American Psychological Association. In: *Interrogations, Forced Feedings, and the Role of Health Professionals: New Perspectives on International Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Ethics*, eds. R. Goodman & M. Roseman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School, pp. 103–142.
- Soldz, S. (2011), Deception detection and torture: The American Psychological Association serves the intelligence services. In: *The CIA on Campus*, ed. P. Zwerling. Jefferson, NC: McFarlans, pp. 113–146.
- Soldz, S. (2015, January 21), The multiple threats of drone warfare. Retrieved from <https://www.bgsp.edu/the-multiple-threats-of-drone-warfare/>
- Soldz, S. (2016, January 19), Protecting the torturers: Bad Faith and distortions from the American Psychological Association. *CounterPunch*. Retrieved from <https://www.counterpunch.org/2006/09/06/protecting-the-torturers/>
- Soldz, S. (2017, June 27), Is psychological ethics in crisis? Retrieved from <https://ethics.harvard.edu/record-june-27-2017>
- Soldz, S., Arrigo, J. M., Frakt, D. J. R. & Olson, B. (in press-a), Response to Staal: “Psychological Ethics and Operational Psychology”—Fundamental issues and methods. *Peace Confl.*
- Soldz, S., Arrigo, J. M., Frakt, D. J. R. & Olson, B. (in press-b), Second response to Staal: Independent moral assessment, an essential requirement for ethical practice in operational psychology. *Peace Confl.*
- Soldz, S., Arrigo, J. M. & Olson, B. (2016), *The Ethics of Operational Psychology Workshop: Report on Process, Findings, and Ethical Conundrums September 15–17, 2015, Brookline, MA* (No. 2) (p. 31). Coalition for an Ethical Psychology. Retrieved from <http://www.ethicalpsychology.org/Ethics-of-Operational-Psychology-Workshop-Report.pdf>
- Soldz, S., Olson, B. & Arrigo, J. M. (2017), Interrogating the ethics of operational psychology. *J. Comm. Appl. Soc. Psychol.* 27:273–286. <https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2321>
- Soldz, S., Raymond, N., Reisner, S., Allen, S. A., Baker, I. L. & Keller, A. S. (2015), All the President’s Psychologists: The American Psychological Association’s secret complicity with the White House and US intelligence community in support of the CIA’s “enhanced” interrogation program. Retrieved from http://www.scra27.org/files/9614/3777/1227/Soldz_Raymond_and_Resiner_All_the_Presidents_Psychologists.pdf
- Soldz, S. & Reisner, S. (2016), Attacks on Hoffman Report from military psychologists obfuscate detainee abuse: A rebuttal to Banks et al. and APA’s Division 19 Task Force. Retrieved from <http://www.ethicalpsychology.org/materials/Rebuttal-to-Hoffman-Report-Critics.pdf>
- Staal, M. A. (2018). Applied psychology under attack: A response to the Brookline principles. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*. Advance online publication. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000333>
- Staal, M. A. (2018). Lies, statistics, and Brookline: A response to Soldz, Arrigo, Frakt, & Olson. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*. Advance online publication. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000332>
- Staal, M. A. & Greene, C. H., III. (2015a), An examination of “adversarial” operational psychology. *Peace Confl.* 21: 264–268. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000095>
- Staal, M. A. & Greene, C. H., III. (2015b), Operational psychology: An ethical practice—A reply to Arrigo, Eidelson, and Rockwood (2015). *Peace Confl.* 21: 279–281. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000097>
- Stone, I. F. (1964, August 24), What few knew about the Tonkin Bay incidents. *I. F. Stone’s Weekly* 12 (28):1–4.
- Summers, F. (2008), Making sense of the APA: A history of the relationship between psychology and the military. *Psychoanal. Dial.* 18:614–637.

- Summers, F. (2017), Counter revolution. *Internat. J. Appl. Psychoanal. Studies* 14:152–160. <https://doi.org/10.1002/aps.1523>
- US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources. (1977, August 3), Project MKULTRA, The CIA's program of research in behavioral modification. US Government Printing Office. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/13inmate_ProjectMKULTRA.pdf
- Younggren, J. N. (2012, October 26), Letter to the coalition for an ethical psychology. Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160401080205/http://ethicalpsychology.org/materials/Div%2042%20Coalition%20Response%20Final.pdf>

Stephen Soldz, Ph.D.
Boston Graduate School of Psychoanalysis
1581 Beacon Street
Brookline, MA 02446
619-663-5840
ssoldz@bgsp.edu